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В начале 1990-х гг. международные отношения 
характеризовались многочисленными изменениями 
мирового порядка и окончанием длительного противо-
стояния двух сверхдержав. Президент Дж. Буш-
старший, который пришел к власти в 1989 г., был 
вынужден бороться с этими резкими изменениями 
мироустройства. В регионе Ближнего и Среднего 
Востока 41-му Президенту США пришлось адапти-
ровать свою внешнюю политику, чтобы она 
соответствовала новому мировому порядку. Админи-
страция Дж. Буша столкнулась с первым полно-
масштабным международным кризисом после оконча-
ния холодной войны летом 1990 г., когда Ирак вторгся 
в соседней Кувейт. Другой региональный лидер – 
Исламская Республика Иран была ослаблена 
политически и экономически, поскольку значительно 
пострадала после войны 1980-88 гг. Основным 
вектором внешней политики США на Среднем 
Востоке, таким образом, было сдерживание попытки 
Саддама Хусейна укрепить свою роль лидера в 
регионе, используя противоречия между Ираном и 
Ираком в Персидском заливе. 
 
 
George. H. W. Bush assumed the US presidency 
during the tumultuous global change. The main 
historic turning point was the end of the Cold War, 
which for four decades has been the determining 
factor in international relations. These changes 
contributed to the development of new US-Soviet 
and, later, US-Russian relations and also slightly 
weakened opposition, even if cooperation did not 
seemed so real. 
The end of the Cold War eased tensions in the 
international system and increased room for 
maneuver in relations between states and non-state 
actors. The collapse of the Soviet Union showed the 
victory of United States in the Cold War, which 
gave full authority to the 41st president to speak 
openly about a “New World Order” based on strong 
international institutions and a high level of 
cooperation between states. Foreign policy in 
administration G. Bush played more significant role 
than domestic, so a strong team of advisers and 
consultants was assembled, which included 
Secretary of State J. Baker, National Security 
Adviser B. Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense D. 
Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
C. Powell. 
US national interests in the Near and Middle 
East remained relatively constant from 1946 to 
1989. The United States pursued three main 
objectives in the region: containment of the Soviet 
Union, maintaining the safe existence for Israel and 
access to oil. The end of the Cold War stopped the 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, the 
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strategy of “containment” has carried out further in 
the region, but the USSR was replaced by such 
states as Iran and Iraq as the object of deterrence. 
In the early 1990’s., international relations were 
characterized by numerous changes in the world 
order and the end of the long confrontation between 
the two superpowers. President G. H. W. Bush, who 
came to power in 1989, was forced to deal with 
these sharp changes in the system of international 
relations. In the region of Near and Middle East G. 
Bush had to adapt his foreign policy to suit the new 
world order. As the containment of Soviet Union 
was already unnecessary and Israeli sovereignty was 
almost guaranteed due to the loss of Soviet influence 
in the Arab countries of the Middle East, access to 
oil became the only vulnerable area of US national 
interests in the region. Thus, American priorities in 
the Middle East at that time focused on the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace process and ensuring 
constant access to Gulf oil. 
George. H. W. Bush administration was 
confronted with the first full-scale international crisis 
after the Cold War in the summer of 1990 when Iraq 
invaded neighboring Kuwait. With decreasing threat 
to the Arab countries of the Middle East by Iran, 
which suffered greatly after the war 1980-88  
Saddam Hussein attempts to strengthen his 
leadership role in the region have failed. The desire 
of Iraq to restore its economy after the war with IRI 
with the help of Gulf countries contrasted with the 
wishes of the GCC and other small monarchies of 
the region and faced with indifference on his 
proposal to establish close relations or political and 
military cooperation with Baghdad. Then Saddam 
Hussein decided to expand his cooperation with 
moderate Arab countries and unite in struggle 
against Iran, initiated the establishment of the Arab 
Cooperation Council (CAC) in February 1989, with 
the participation of North Yemen, Iraq, Jordan and 
Egypt. CAC was created as a response to the fact 
that these four countries were not included in the 
GCC. Iraq also resumed diplomatic relations with 
Egypt and in March 1989 signed an agreement with 
Saudi Arabia
1
. 
However, Saddam Hussein realized that the 
fastest way to expand its influence is through 
diplomacy, and therefore needed the support of the 
US in the international arena. Consequently, 
Baghdad tried to maintain close relations with 
Washington, which got better during the war years 
1980-88.
2
  
The American presence in the Middle East still 
was welcomed by the countries of Persian Gulf  that 
after the Iran-Iraq War were afraid for their safety. 
United States during the administration of 
G. H. W. Bush, in turn, willingly supported 
cooperation with the monarchies of the region, as 
still seen in revolutionary Iran a serious threat to its 
interests in the Persian Gulf. 
Iraq became the main country that was 
supplying oil to the US and European countries. 
Furthermore, he represented a large market for 
exports from Western countries, including grain 
from US arms and technology from France and 
Germany. Iraq also had great significance for the 
maintenance of peace in the Middle East since 
played an important role in supporting the historic 
recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
of Israel’s right to exist in November 1988 and 
supported a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. While it was widely believed in the 
international community that Saddam Hussein 
stepped on a moderate path, though, as the political 
scientist K. Juster noted, in retrospect it was wishful 
thinking
3
.  
So June 23, 1989 the meeting of the National 
Security Council was held to discuss issues that 
concerned the policy on the Persian Gulf and George 
H. W. Bush has signed 2 October 1989 National 
Security Directive 26, which stated US foreign 
policy vectors in the Gulf region
4
.   
The Directive stated that access to the oil fields 
of the Persian Gulf and the security of friendly to US 
countries in the region are vital to national security 
and the United States obliged to defend those 
interests and if necessary to use military force. It also 
argued that normalization of relations between the 
United States and Iraq will serve long-term interests 
and promote stability in the Persian Gulf in 
particular and in the Middle East in general. 
Directive empowered the US government on 
political, economic and other incentives toward Iraq 
to promote the development of bilateral relations and 
maintain Saddam Hussein’s moderate foreign policy 
direction. Directive №26 encouraged American 
companies to take part in the reconstruction of the 
Iraqi economy, including energy, and proposed to 
consider the supply to Iraq of non-lethal military aid 
and medical supplies
5
. 
Thus, US Department of Agriculture issued a 
loan of $1.05 billion to Iraq for the purchase of grain 
and farm machinery, and in June 1989, a large 
delegation of businessmen from the US gathered in 
Baghdad which emphasized the high level of 
cooperation in this area. The State Department was 
also interested in the continuation of Commodity 
Credit Cooperation, on which Washington’s 
influence on Baghdad depended because it could 
promote the peace process in the Middle East and 
influence the behavior of Iraq, limiting missile 
proliferation in the region. 
However, in 1990 there have been great changes 
in the foreign policy of Iraq. Once it became known 
that Iraq redirected American loans aimed to finance 
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agricultural goods to finance its military programs, 
officials began to express deep concern about the 
credit program
6
.  
To limit the armament policy of Iraq the United 
States not only suspend Commodity Credit 
Cooperation, forbidding any credits in Iraq, but also 
developing a campaign to persuade other countries 
such as France, Germany, USSR, Japan, pay 
attention to the threat of nuclear, missile, chemical 
and biological warfare in the region
7
. In particular, 
European countries decided to confiscate high-tech 
devices that Iraqi companies acquired before that for 
its weapons program. 
The United States, after Saddam Hussein’s 
threats against Israel and ignoring calls to stop 
escalating nuclear and chemical weapons, decided to 
respond decisively, proposing a series of measures 
that limit economic freedom of Iraq. Congress, 
along with the general trade embargo and travel ban, 
also voted for a more severe decline in exports of 
dual-use technologies and prohibited any assistance 
to Iraq until it permits the international inspection to 
examine its military facility. Not surprisingly, the 
tough US policy on nuclear, chemical and missile 
arming in Iraq has led to the condemnation of 
Baghdad even among his Arab supporters, namely, 
Libya, Palestine and Jordan
8
. 
In the summer 1990, the relations between Iraq 
and Kuwait deteriorated sharply because of the 
controversy surrounding oil prices and OPEC quotas 
set for its production. Although August 1, 1990 in 
Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) began Iraqi-Kuwaiti 
negotiations, the leaders did not come to any 
agreement, and August 2 Iraq invaded Kuwait, 
attaching it on the rights of 19th province. 
Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait was convicted 
around the world. August 2 UN Security Council 
passed resolution 660, which condemned the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the economic sanctions 
against Iraq were imposed August 6, 1990 in 
accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 
661. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President 
George. H. W. Bush August 20, 1990 approved the 
Directive 45, which dislocated forces in the Gulf 
region to protect Saudi Arabia and other US friendly 
countries from Iraqi aggression and to ensure the 
implementation of UN resolutions
9
. The United 
States conducted also two military operations - 
January 17, 1991 the military command has 
suspended defensive mission “Desert Shield” and 
then started the fighting as part of “Desert Storm”, 
held by coalition troops from 34 countries led by the 
United States
10
. 
At the suggestion of the US November 29, 1990 
UNSC by Resolution 678 allowed the use of 
military force against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. 
League of Arab States, Western European Union, 
NATO, and the Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf 
States supported the decision to use military force. 
Until February 1991, Iraqi troops were driven out of 
Kuwait, and the Iraqi Republican Guard units were 
completely destroyed. 
The war ended in less than two months, and the 
Bush administration successfully coped with the 
largest military deployment since the war in 
Vietnam without suffering major military losses – 
148 American soldiers were killed during the Gulf 
War
11
. Gulf War resumed military spirit of the US 
Army and weakened the negative memories of the 
Vietnam War. Also promoted approval of “New 
World Order” as stated George H. W. Bush breaking 
the alliances of the Cold War and using peaceful 
unification of the countries against the rogue states
12
. 
President of the United States successfully led 
coalition and even made sure that many countries 
have provided military support (including France, 
UK, Saudi Arabia and Egypt) and financial support 
(including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan and 
Germany) in the war of 1991. 
Realizing the imbalance of power in the region, 
the United States and the international community 
defeated Iraq, but deliberately did not destroy its 
power. As National Security Council staff director in 
charge of the Middle East R. Haass noted, the 
administration has calculated that strategically better 
to leave Iraq strong enough to balance the Iranian 
influence in the region, however, as administration 
hoped not strong enough to intimidate or interfere in 
affairs of its Arab neighbors
13
. Such US strategy 
gave the rise of the final differences in US-Iranian 
relations and interests in the region, which further 
differed even more after the Gulf War. 
Also, this was the main reason why Bush 
administration did not trusted and decided not to 
help the Shia uprising in southern Iraq, which broke 
out in March 1991 because Iran was implicated in it. 
IRI called for Iranian uprising and sent fighters to 
join the rebels. 
According to G. Gause, neutrality of the United 
States was probably one of the main reasons why the 
uprising, which broke out among Shiite and Kurdish 
population, was not successful and failed to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power
14
. George H. W. Bush 
and National Security Adviser B. Scowcroft initially 
stated they do not want any US forces be involved in 
the instability inside Iraq, as hoping that Saddam 
Hussein and his regime will be overthrown as a 
result of popular uprising or coup
15
. Their opinion 
reflected the US concerns about long-term balance 
of power in the Gulf. 
There were other reasons why the US did not 
support the rebellion in southern and northern Iraq. 
As not only American military commanders and 
coalition army operating in the Gulf, but also the US 
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government believed that the regime of Saddam 
Hussein would fall in short period of time, and 
therefore US considered that involvement of its 
troops was unnecessary. Another cause was the 
desire to withdraw US troops from the Persian Gulf 
to stabilize the region and not shake relations in the 
Middle East. In addition, one more factor played an 
important role: international pressure from China, 
the Soviet Union, and Turkey and other countries in 
the Gulf region, such as Jordan, Syria, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia, which opposed the creation of the 
Kurdish state
16
. 
However, Washington has decided not to 
support the Iraqi intifada mainly because he was 
afraid that Iran become the main country that will 
receive the greatest benefits from the revolution in 
Iraq. The intentions of President George H. W. Bush 
were quite pragmatic and lay in to leave Baghdad 
strong enough to be able to resist Iran. After all, 
Iranians remained hostile to the United States from 
the time of the Iran-Iraq war, when the United States 
suddenly sided with Iraq to prevent Iranian 
domination in the Gulf region. 
Several factors influenced the US-Iranian 
relations after the Gulf War in 1991. First, as already 
noted, was the refusal of the USA to support the 
Shia uprising in Iraq and affect the removal of 
Saddam Hussein from power, because the United 
States did not intend to risk and excessively weaken 
Baghdad because it supposed to be strong enough to 
counter Iran in the region. This became the 
“practical purpose” of the US, as C. Powell noted17. 
Another factor was that George H. W. Bush was 
convinced that the tensions in the Gulf, which 
included the US-Iranian relations, should be viewed 
more broadly than just a regional problem. The 
President held extensive consultations on the issue, 
even within the government meeting. This reflected 
the efforts of George H. W. Bush to value events 
globally and associated with the intention of 
Secretary of State G. Baker to distance from the 
personnel of department, which was in charge of 
cooperation with Saddam Hussein
18
. 
As officials from the State Department noted, 
the President considered the relationship in the Gulf 
not like the traditional Middle East crisis but like the 
first conflict in the post-bipolar world, that is why, in 
his opinion, its solution required new thinking and 
new approaches
19
. 
In order to sound out the possible prospects of 
postwar cooperation and economic collaboration 
George H. W. Bush has sent Secretary of State J. 
Baker in March with visit to the Middle East 
countries
20
. Within the visit, the administration had 
prepared a new attempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in Madrid in autumn 1991 with the hope of 
cooperation and opportunities of New World Order. 
The third important factor was the conclusions 
that have made for themselves Gulf countries and 
IRI after the Iran-Iraq war. While the Arab countries 
of the Middle East have confirmed their desire and 
need for protection from external forces, namely the 
United States, Iran has made almost the opposite 
conclusion. The Islamic Republic saw in such 
cooperation a major threat to its own ambitions and 
influence on policy in the region
21
. Therefore, Iran 
resumed relations with Saudi Arabia, and enhanced 
its cooperation with several Gulf States, including 
Bahrain, Oman, UAE and Yemen. 
However, establishing relations with 
neighboring countries did not have any result. 
Mutual mistrust and conflicting intentions of 
regional players made it impossible to negotiate 
successfully on a joint collective security in the 
region, and once again undermined ambitions of Iran 
and once again convinced it to blame the US desire 
to influence the affairs of the Gulf
 22
. However, the 
failure to cooperate on regional security was 
partially offset by success in the economic sphere. In 
May 1991, Iranian leaders have proclaimed by loud 
statement that the government is open to investment 
and cooperation with the business (particularly 
European) and returns to the world economic 
community. Iran’s economy was in very bad 
condition, in 1990 GDP per capita fell by 42% than 
in 1977, and state funding for such areas as health, 
education and housing fell by half
23
. 
Considering that Iran’s efforts to improve 
relations with the rest of the world were primarily 
motivated by economic decline, Deputy Foreign 
Minister A. Maleki persuaded of the need to 
continue improving relations with the US, arguing 
that it may take 10 years before Iran will master all 
other existing markets. He offered to welcome 
commercial ties between the countries, but not to 
develop relations to a greater level or in other 
areas.
24
. 
The last factor was that the Gulf War did not 
change the George H. W. Bush belief that the 
hostages remain a major sticking point in US-Iranian 
relations. The sudden invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, 
though not immediately, but gave impetus to resolve 
this problem. As the scientist D. Murray noted, a 
number of factors contributed to curb the crisis of 
hostages: the weakening of Iraq and the prospect of 
new geopolitical opportunities; H. Rafsanjani’s 
efforts to implement economic reforms and to a 
lesser extent, to convince the international 
community that Iran serves as a reliable, stable, 
focused on a diplomatic solution to the conflicts 
player; fear that the US will seek to nullify all the 
efforts of Iran; and finally, the influence of Tehran 
on Lebanese terrorists
25
.  
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After all the hostages were liberated, George H. 
W. Bush decided to go to a certain rapprochement 
with Iran. The proof of such policy was the fact that 
in September 1991, Secretary of State J. Baker said 
Perez de Cuellar that the US is ready to restore 
diplomatic relations with Iran, and were willing to 
meet Iranian Foreign Minister H. Velayati in New 
York
26
. National Security Council officials on 
Middle East issues B. Riedel was even ordered to 
develop a document with the main options for 
establishing negotiations
27
.  
However, some circumstances prevent 
rapprochement between the two countries. Several 
assassinations, including former Prime Minister S. 
Bakhtiar in August 1991 and growing tensions 
between Iran and neighboring countries in the Gulf 
confirmed that Tehran is not going to change the 
vector of its radical foreign policy
28
. 
Moreover, it was reported that Iran seeks to 
improve its nuclear program and attempts to create 
nuclear weapons. Although after the revolution in 
1979 Iran suspended its nuclear program because of 
radically negative attitude to nuclear energy by its 
new leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, but devastating 
Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, confrontation with the 
US and a growing number of facts about a secret 
Iraqi nuclear weapons program largely prompted 
Ayatollah Khomeini to restore Iran’s nuclear 
program. IAEA reports in 2009 showed that in April 
1984, the President Khamenei declared that 
Ayatollah Khomeini decided to resume nuclear 
program as the only way of ensuring the collapse of 
the Islamic revolution from its enemies, especially 
the United States and Israel
29
.  
While the US often introduce economic 
sanctions against hostile countries, but foreign 
policy towards Iraq in the late 1980s was an 
exception. From August 1988 to August 1990 – the 
period between the end of the Iran-Iraq war and 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait – US sought to “engage” 
Iraq to moderate its behavior and build bilateral 
relations. During this period, Washington kept trade 
relations with Iraq and gave credit for the supply of 
agricultural products. 
Discussions about finding the best strategies to 
deal with recalcitrant regimes and the relative 
advantages of containment strategies against the 
policy of engagement were conducted since the 
early 1980s after the debate on the implementation 
of Reagan administration policy of “constructive 
engagement” toward South Africa. Although 
engagement strategies were much less applied in US 
foreign policy because of the popularity of punitive 
methods - such as sanctions and military force, they 
emphasize the need to identify the most favorable 
circumstances, the use of incentives or rewards for 
the formation of rough state behavior
30
. 
Although, according to some scientists, 
including K. Juster, US foreign policy of partial 
“engagement” toward Iraq was not successful, 
researchers of the Brookings Institution R. Haass 
and M. O’Sullivan argued that engagement strategy, 
not being very successful during application may 
ultimately contribute while involving the assistance 
of other countries and their aid as in the military 
confrontation and in the application of sanctions
31
. 
The situation with Iraq showed it the best, because 
namely such foreign policy toward Baghdad before 
the Gulf War has helped the US to mobilize a large 
international coalition and prevent the claims of 
Arab countries that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 
was made in response to pressure from the United 
States. 
Nevertheless, the result was not so 
unambiguous. As noted by Z. Brzezinski the 
response of G. H. W. Bush on Iraq’s aggression 
against Kuwait showed his greatest military victory, 
and the most unconvincing political result
32
. The 
decision to go with war against Baghdad, to achieve 
the desired result by force, eventually became a 
crucial test of character and leadership of George. 
H. W. Bush. According to the author of Second 
Chance, geostrategic implications of personal 
triumph proved more problematic, because although 
Saddam Hussein was defeated and humiliated, he 
stayed in power, and the region continued to suffer 
from instability and disputes, including the Shiite-
Sunni confrontation. George H. W. Bush in 
monograph World Transformed, written with 
National Security Advisor B. Scowcroft, convinced 
that the prosecution of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and 
attempts to overthrow his government would then 
lead to the destabilization of the region and to the 
long military resistance
33
. 
Anglo-American coalition has created an 
opportunity for the US to use its special status in the 
Middle East to address the fiercest conflict in the 
region, which has caused many hardships and 
became the main source of growing anti-American 
disposition, and namely the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. March 6, 1991 President George H. W. 
Bush made an official statement, declaring its 
intention to achieve a profound peace agreement 
between Israel and its neighbors. And by the end of 
1991 Peace Conference was organized jointly with 
the Soviet Union in the Madrid, which took place on 
October 30 with the participation of Israel, Syria, 
Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO. However, the parties 
have not reached the common plan to solve the 
problem despite the strong statement of 
George H. W. Bush in March 1991. 
George. W. Bush had more advantage to 
achieve a breakthrough in the peaceful settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, according to Z. Brzezinski 
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than any other US president since the days of 
Eisenhower Administration. Nevertheless, he did not 
use the great prestige of the United States at that 
time in the region to press on the parties of the 
conflict and to establish specific principles of the 
key contentious issues of confrontation in the 
Middle East
34
. However, the biggest drawback of 
Bush presidency was that, although it was difficult 
to justify the actions of the United States without a 
clear national interest, but declaring a new approach 
in US foreign policy, he was not able to realize the 
promising New World Order and take greater role as 
a world leader at the end of the Cold War to protect 
democratic regimes and human rights improvement.  
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Павлюк О. І. ПОЛІТИКА США ЩОДО 
РЕГІОНУ ПЕРСЬКОЇ ЗАТОКИ ПІД ЧАС 
АДМІНІСТРАЦІЇ ДЖ. БУША-СТАРШОГО 
На початку 1990-х рр. міжнародні відносини 
характеризувались численними змінами світово-
го порядку та закінченням довготривалого про-
тистояння двох наддержав. Президент Дж. Буш-
старший, який прийшов до влади в 1989 р., був 
змушений боротися з цими різкими змінами 
світоустрою. У регіоні Близького та Середнього 
Сходу 41-му Президенту США  довелося адапту-
вати свою зовнішню політику, щоб вона відпові-
дала новому світовому порядку. Американська 
присутність на Середньому Сході дуже віталась 
монархіями регіону, які після Ірано-іракської 
війни побоювались за свою безпеку. Сполучені 
Штати за адміністрації Дж. Буша-старшого, в 
свою чергу, охоче підтримували співпрацю з мо-
нархіями регіону, оскільки як і раніше вбачали в 
революційному Ірані серйозну загрозу для своїх 
інтересів в Перській затоці.  
Основною країною постачання нафти в 
США та західні країни став Ірак. Крім того він 
представляв великий ринок для експорту захід-
них країн, зокрема зерна з США, озброєння та 
техніки з Франції та Німеччини. Ірак також мав 
велике значення для підтримання миру на 
                                                                                          
Близькому і Середньому Сході, оскільки відіграв 
важливу роль у підтримці історичного визнання 
Організацією визволення Палестини права 
Ізраїлю на існування в листопаді 1988 р. та 
підтримав мирне врегулювання арабо-ізраїльсь-
кого конфлікту. В той час серед міжнародного 
співтовариства широко була поширена думка, 
що С. Хусейн став на більш поміркований шлях, 
хоча, в ретроспективі це було прийняття бажано-
го за дійсне. 
Аміністрація Дж. Буша зіткнулась з першою 
повномасштабною міжнародною кризою після 
закінчення холодної війни влітку 1990 р., коли 
Ірак вторгся у сусідній Кувейт. Інший регіо-
нальний лідер – Ісламська Республіка Іран була 
слабка, оскільки значно постраждала після війни 
1980-88 рр. Основним вектором зовнішньої полі-
тики США на Середньому сході, таким чином, 
було стримування намагання С. Хусейна зміцни-
ти свою роль лідера в регіоні, використовуючи 
протистояння між Іраном та Іраком у Перській 
затоці. 
Ключові слова: зовнішня політика США, 
Перська затока, Ірак, Іран, Війна у Перській 
затоці 1991 р., адміністрація Дж. Буша-
старшого. 
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